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Before addressing the question of whether surgeons are
ethically obligated to treat Medicare patients despite a sub-
stantial reduction in reimbursement, I must make some dis-
closures. First, as a professor of surgery and chief of the
Division of Cardiothoracic Surgery for 25 years, I have
worked in an academic medical center my entire career
and not in a fee-for-service reward environment. I have
had responsibility for the financial viability of the Division
of Cardiothoracic Surgery but was only indirectly influ-
enced by reimbursement patterns by private payers, Medi-
care, or Medicaid. I have not had to directly deal with the
issues of increasing practice support expenses, more
administrative support needs, or a strict fee-for-service
remuneration environment that might affect my salary or
the salary of our faculty. Second, some variables based on
context and circumstances shade the debate, although at
the end of the day, in the predominantly urgent and emer-
gency world of cardiothoracic surgery where healing is
the primary end point, such issues should be relatively
minor in relevance.
First, location of practice and the availability of other
specialists can cloud the fundamental ethical imperative
and make the decision easier for the urban surgeon to justify
not accepting a Medicare patient. One surgeon may be sur-
rounded by many younger surgeons, eagerly trying to de-
velop a sustainable practice, and therefore make the
decision to personally withhold care easier. In comparison,
the lone practitioner in a smaller, rural practice environment
may not have other surgical alternatives and may be under
closer local, environmental scrutiny. Therefore, the decision
to withhold care based on personal remuneration, if publi-
cized, may be more visible and difficult.From the Division of Cardiothoracic Surgery, the Department of Surgery, University
of Washington Medical Center, Seattle, Wash.
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38 The Journal of Thoracic and Cardiovascular SurgeNext, there might be a difference between ‘‘emergency’’
versus ‘‘urgent’’ versus ‘‘elective’’ versus ‘‘cosmetic’’ sur-
gical practices. Clearly, many plastic surgeons doing pri-
marily cosmetic surgery demand cash up front before
accepting any type of patient, never mind just Medicare pa-
tients. Such behavior appears to be widely accepted
ethically by societal standards. In contrast, the life of the
patient with an acute aortic dissection may depend on emer-
gency surgical therapy regardless of the payment scheme.
The ability to deny care on any basis other than solid
medical decision making would be more difficult.
The next context deals with the issue of personal income
based on the fee-for-service model versus basically receiv-
ing a salary whether that be hospital based as is increasingly
occurring in the United States or societal based as in coun-
tries with universal access or global insurance. If one re-
moves from the table the fee-for-service issue, where
personal income is based on reimbursement minus operat-
ing expenses, is there a different moral imperative? If the fi-
nancial issue is eliminated, would you treat one patient
differently from another given similar medical issues?
Finally, one cannot confuse broader health care alloca-
tion of resources and end of life issues in the Medicare pop-
ulation, which might also be an ethical societal dilemma in
withholding care based on physician reimbursement. This
discussion is not one of age discrimination. This question
is phrased on the basis of Medicare remuneration, but in re-
ality it is a broader ethical question: can a surgeon refuse to
care for any patient because of a substantial reduction in
reimbursement?
In the case of cardiothoracic surgery, we have to be a little
careful in the public eye to use the argument of a ‘‘substan-
tial’’ reduction in surgeon income unless there is clear evi-
dence such a trend is occurring. Substantial has a variety of
potential meanings, but according to the Oxford English
Dictionary, substantial is defined as ‘‘of considerable im-
portance, size, or worth, concerning the essentials of some-
thing, or real and tangible rather than imaginary.’’ The
evidence that substantial applies to our discussion is specu-
lative at best. The last significant reported trend analysis
based on analysis of Medicare reimbursement for coronary
artery bypass surgery was reported in 2006 in the Bulletin of
the American College of Surgeons.1 From 1995 to 2007
there was an estimated 8.2% decline in inflation-adjusted
income for cardiac surgeons based on a decrease in reim-
bursement for coronary artery bypass graft operations
from $3957 in 1988 to $2051 in 2003. There have been rel-
atively minor reductions in reimbursement for bypassry c January 2013
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pensated for that trend by increasing volume, adding new
operations, or improving coding skills. There is little cor-
roborating evidence that a significant reduction in surgeon
salary has occurred. If one goes to the Bureau of Labor Sta-
tistics2 and looks at all occupations in the United States, the
occupation title for the very highest paid employment is
‘‘surgeon’’ at an average salary of $225,390. If one then
looks at the site of practice, the annual income in the offices
of physicians is $241,060 in comparison with general med-
ical or surgical hospital ($204,970) or university/profes-
sional schools ($155,740).3 Thus it appears that the office
practitioner has not been affected more than alternative sites
of practice. If one then looks at the national 6-year income
average for cardiothoracic surgeons reported in 2011, the
figure is approximately $522,875, which ranks second be-
hind neurosurgeons as the second highest surgical income
level.4 Similar data exist for general surgery and most other
surgical specialties. In the current real world, we cannot ar-
gue that the word ‘‘substantial’’ as applicable; we can later
discuss this as a theoretical concept. Initially, we should
now address the fundamental question of this debate: are
surgeons ethically obligated to treat patients despite a reduc-
tion in reimbursement?
Basic medical ethical principles include autonomy, be-
neficence, nonmaleficence, dignity, and, finally, truthful-
ness and honesty.5 In very simple terms, autonomy refers
to the right of individuals to self-determination, to make
their own choices and decisions; beneficence refers to
the physician’s moral obligation to promote the wellbeing
of others; nonmaleficence refers to first, do no harm; jus-
tice refers to fairness and equality in the treatment of all
with due reward and honor; dignity refers to the intrinsic
worth of patient and provider; and truthfulness and honesty
basically refer to informed consent. The 2 primary ethical
principles involved in this debate are justice and benefi-
cence. The concept of justice dates back to Aristotle,
who conceptualized justice as the rendering to each indi-
vidual that which is due to him or her. More recent influ-
ences in biomedical ethics originate from John Rawls’ A
Theory of Justice,5 in which he argues that a social ar-
rangement forming a political state is a communal effort
to advance the good of all in society. Most socioeconomic
considerations fall under the concept of justice. This con-
cept has evolved into a patient’s bill of rights. Although
not formally adopted by Congress in 2001 (McCain-Ed-
wards-Kennedy Patient Bill of Rights), most of the con-
cepts in the patient’s bill of rights were adopted locally
in every state and by health care organizations like the
American Medical Association. Among the 4 positive
rights of a patient, the following 2 are included: (1) to
be treated by a knowledgeable, competent practitioner
and (2) to have his or her health and wellbeing more
highly valued than the surgeon’s own economic interest.The Journal of Thoracic and CBeneficence, or this concept of a moral obligation to act
for the benefit of helping others, is often argued as the es-
sential foundation of medical ethics. This leads to the
concept of a physician as having a moral fiduciary respon-
sibility toward the patients. The surgeon is a person hold-
ing the character of trustee in respect to the trust and
confidence involved in it and scrupulous good faith that
it requires. In other words, the surgeon is someone who
undertakes an act for and on behalf of another in a partic-
ular matter of circumstances that give rise to a relationship
of trust and confidence. Opinion 10.15 from the American
Medical Association states: ‘‘The relationship between pa-
tient and physician is based on trust and gives rise to phy-
sicians’ ethical obligations to place patients’ welfare above
their own self-interest and above obligations to other
groups, and to advocate for their patients’ welfare.’’6
The question then becomes, is such behavior a moral ob-
ligation or a moral ideal? The obligation of social nonma-
leficence (do no harm) is widely accepted, but the
obligations of social justice and social beneficence are
more widely debated.
The historical precedence for this line of argument is
based on the Hippocratic Oath but even more on the
moral-sentiment theory of David Hume, the utilitarianism
theory of John Stuart Mill, and the moral imperative the-
ory of Immanuel Kant. The original Hippocratic Oath re-
quires that ‘‘whatever houses I may visit, I will come for
the benefit of the sick.’’ The oath has evolved over time,
and one newer version of the oath states ‘‘the provider
(surgeon) undertakes to care for the health of the purchaser
(patient) to use his or her best endeavors to correct any de-
fects therein and to prevent the development of further
harm.’’7 Edmund Pellegrino8 more recently reinterpreted
parts of the Hippocratic Oath to say, ‘‘physicians are not
and must never be, commercial entrepreneurs, gate-
closers, or agents of fiscal policy that runs counter to our
trust.’’ Hume9 argued that benevolence accounts for the or-
igins of morality rather than psychologic egoism or private
interest. Whereas he felt justice was a social virtue, he be-
lieved benevolence was a ‘‘principle’’ of human nature.
Mill’s theory of utilitarianism10 states that one must act
so as to produce the greatest aggregate happiness among
sentient beings, within reason. When harms and benefits
are weighed to both parties involved, harm to the patient
will always outweigh benefit to the surgeon. Finally,
Kant11 stated that everything has either a price or a digni-
ty . whatever has a price can be replaced by something
else as its equivalent; on the other hand, whatever is above
all price, and therefore admits of no equivalent, has a dig-
nity. Providing care for our fellow beings has dignity, is
a moral imperative, and we as physicians have a duty to
provide such care.
We finally come back to the gray shading of this discus-
sion, probably not black and white. I believe the surgeon asardiovascular Surgery c Volume 145, Number 1 39
Point/Counterpoint Verriera medical fiduciary is a moral ideal, approaching a moral
obligation. Reimbursement should not affect the physi-
cian–patient relationship. In reality, many economists argue
that economics actually drive the moral behavior of physi-
cians.12 There are multiple examples where reimbursement
goes down but volume goes up or coding for reimbursement
changes. Surgeons should be paid on the basis of the diffi-
culty or uniqueness of the services rendered, the time, skill,
and expertise required, the fee customarily charged for sim-
ilar services, some sort of overall societal value in compar-
ison to other professions, the quality of performance, and
maybe the experience, reputation, and ability of the surgeon
performing the service. If a ‘‘substantial’’ reduction in reim-
bursement occurs, is there a point where the surgeon can say
no? Obviously, inadequately reimbursed care that signifi-
cantly affects quality does heighten these ethical questions.
One can argue that if the fee-for-service mentality that is
unique to the United States went away, this type of ethical
question would be much easier to face. Care would be pro-
vided based on doing the right thing, for the right person, at
the right time. At this point in history, culture still holds car-
diothoracic surgeons in high esteem and compensates us
well, substantially because it still trusts us to behave ethi-
cally, emphatically, and to serve our patients’ best interests
before our own. As stated in The Ethics of Surgical Prac-
tice: ‘‘. continue to practice surgery on the basis of scien-
tific evidence, clinical indications, fiduciary responsibility,40 The Journal of Thoracic and Cardiovascular Surgeand empathic regards for the genuine needs of patients re-
mains the best response to the forces that have buffeted
medicine.’’13References
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